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Note, Isolationism or Deference? The Alien Tort Claims Act
and the Separation of Powers
Victor A. Pappalardo*
I. INTRODUCTION
The First United States Congress incorporated the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, into federal law through the passage of
the First Judiciary Act in 1789. The Act states that "[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States." The Second Circuit utilized this statute in its
landmark decision, Filartiga v. Petia Irala, I which found within its lan-
guage jurisdiction to adjudicate international human rights claims.
Since the Filartiga decision, the issue of the validity of adjudicating
international human rights claims in United States federal courts has
become a topic of debate among the courts and commentators. A stiff
rejection of the Filartiga rationale has come from those who argue that
such adjudication violates the courts' duty to maintain the separation
of powers among the three branches of the U.S. government. These
opponents contend that adjudications like Filartiga necessarily touch
on foreign policy matters reserved by the Constitution to the political
branches of Government.
This Note examines the rationales behind Filartiga and other cases
which have had the opportunity to pass upon its holding, notably the
holdings in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic2 and Forti v. Suarez-
Mason. 3 It then focuses on the validity of these rationales with respect
to the constitutional separation of powers scheme. In so doing, it ana-
lyzes Filartiga's conclusions in light of the act of state and political
question doctrines, two closely interrelated doctrines which have been
at the forefront of the separation of powers criticisms of Filartiga.
This Note concludes by suggesting that a clear case exists for the claim
that human rights adjudications under the Alien Tort Claims Act do
not violate the constitutional mandates of separation of powers.
* University of Michigan Law School, Class of 1989.
1. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
3. 672 F.Supp. 1531 (9th Cir. 1987), motion to reconsider granted in part, denied in part, 694
F.Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
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II. THE FILARTIGA RATIONALE IN THE COURTS
A. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala and the International Law
of Human Rights
The Filartiga case arose out of the kidnapping and apparent tor-
ture-murder of the seventeen year old son of Dr. Joel Filartiga, an
opponent of Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner's government.
Dr. Filartiga and his daughter charged that the defendant, Americo
Norberto Pefia-Irala, the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay, wrongfully caused the death of Joelito Filartiga by kidnap-
ping and torturing him to death in reprisal for his father's anti-govern-
ment activities. 4 The Filartigas failed to get any sort of criminal
conviction or redress against Pefia through the Paraguayan justice sys-
tem.5 In 1978, however, Pefia entered the United States on a visitor's
visa and took up residence in Brooklyn, New York.6 Dolly Filartiga,
sister of the victim, learned of Pefia's presence and, with her father,
commenced this wrongful death action against him for the torture-
murder of Joelito Filartiga.
7
The plaintiffs' complaint stated the cause of action as arising under
"wrongful death statutes; the U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration
on Human Rights; the U.N. Declaration Against Torture; the Ameri-
can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and other pertinent
declarations, documents and practices constituting the customary in-
ternational law of human rights and the law of nations," as well as 28
U.S.C. § 1350, article II, section 2, and the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. 8 The plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction under the gen-
eral federal question provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 9 The Second Circuit noted that the
"threshold question" regarding jurisdiction under section 1350 was
whether the alleged conduct violated the law of nations.' 0 Therefore,
discussion of the Filartiga holding cannot be undertaken without a
cursory look at the validity of the international legal principles upon
4. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
5. Id. at 878. As a result of the Paraguayan judicial system's failure to allow the Filartigas
redress for the alleged murder, the Second Circuit was not required to dismiss the case under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
6. Id. at 878.
7. Upon learning of his presence in the United States Ms. Filartiga informed the Immigration
and Naturalization Service of Pefia's whereabouts, and they, in turn, arrested him and ordered
him deported for overstaying his visa. At the time this action was filed, Pefia was being held in
Brooklyn pending deportation. The Filartigas sought to enjoin his deportation to ensure his
availability for testimony at trial, but by the time of the Second Circuit's holding, Pefia had been
deported. Id. at 878-79.
8. Id. at 879.
9. On appeal to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs focused their claim principally on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350. Id.
10. Id. at 880.
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which it was based. "
The modern international law of human rights can be traced most
clearly to the years immediately following the Second World War, at
which time the United Nations Charter, the Nirnberg Tribunals and
several key U.N. declarations, including the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,' 2 affirmed an international commitment to human
rights. Prior to the time of the Niirnberg trials, the individual's re-
sponsibility for actions violative of international human rights norms
was, arguably, unclear. 13 The guilty verdicts handed down against the
defendants at Nurnberg, however, showed that the horrors of two
world wars had changed the international assessment of an individ-
ual's responsibility to humanity.'
4
The human rights norms that grew out of Niirnberg and the
United Nations at this time have achieved nearly universal acceptance.
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was specifically
characterized as a "common standard of achievement"' 5 not declara-
tory of any existing standard of law, its principles appear' 6 to have
11. Numerous scholarly treatises and international conventions hold that torture and other
egregious violations of human rights are now a part of the customary law of nations. See, e.g.,
infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. Since the primary focus of this Note is the incorpora-
tion of international law into U.S. law, this Note does not examine this issue in as much depth as
it deserves.
12. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc A/180 at 71
(1948), the U.N. Declaration on Civil and Political Rights; the Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3542 (XXX) (1975); and the Affirmation
of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal,
G.A. Res. 95(I) (1946). See also Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic
Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 370, who traces the origins of international law as far back as the
traditional law governing State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens which "required all states to
adhere to an 'international minimum standard' of procedural and substantive justice in their
treatment of aliens." He points out that when the United States signed the U.N. Charter in 1945,
its acceptance of the human rights principles thus extended this "longstanding recognition of an
'international minimum standard' to include all human beings rather than just aliens." Accord-
ing to Lillich, the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights were a mere reaffirmation of those longstanding values.
13. The question whether the NUrnberg judgments represented new law or a manifestation of
existing law was highly controversial. See LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 42-47 (1950); see also Finch, The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, 41 AM. J.
INT'L L. 20-37 (1947); Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38-72
(1947).
14. The individual has never been a nonentity in international law. There have traditionally
been norms allowing any state to punish an individual for piracy, and during the nineteenth
century a new norm arose allowing universal prosecution for those involved in the slave trade.
15. G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/180, at 72 (1948).
16. A notable contrary view, discussed at length later in this Note, was expressed by Judge
Bork in his concurrence in Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 817-820; see also Watson, Legal Theory, Effi-
cacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in International Law, 3 U. ILL. L.
FORUM 609 (1979); Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change In World Legal Order, 6 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 269 (1978). The argument that these standards have evolved into international
legal standards is, however, strengthened by the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights was enunciated in 1948 when the the international law of human rights, at least as it
regarded individuals acting on behalf of a state, was in its infancy.
[Vol. 10:886
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achieved general acceptance as statements of customary international
law. 7 Subsequent international declarations prohibiting torture and
the nearly universal condemnation of the practice in the legal systems
of the world have emphasized this development.' 8  Recognition has
also resulted from the belief that the widespread acceptance of certain
human rights norms, most notably prohibitions against torture and
genocide,' 9 carries a stronger legal authority than the considerable
contrary practice that still exists in the world today.20 Thus, while it
may be argued that international law once predominantly focused
upon conduct between states, in the past forty years it has widened to
encompass a variety of norms governing individual action. Though
U.N. Declarations are often accorded only dubious legality, the uni-
versal acceptance of the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights indicates
that such norms have achieved the status of customary international
law. 2' As a result, the international community widely accepts indi-
vidual responsibility under these norms.
In Filartiga, the Second Circuit took careful note of the widespread
acceptance of these norms in holding that the charges against Pefia, if
proven, constituted a violation of customary international law. 22 The
U.S. Government also submitted both an amicus brief supporting this
contention 23 as well as a 1979 State Department report which ac-
knowledged that "[t]here now exists an international consensus that
recognizes basic human rights and obligations owed by all govern-
ments to their citizens .... There is no doubt that these rights are
often violated; but virtually all governments acknowledge their valid-
ity. '" 24 The Second Circuit's holding that "the law of nations," as uti-
17. See 0. SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 339 (1985).
18. Lillich, Part II: Global Protection of Human Rights, in I HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 116-117 (Theodor Meron ed. 1984); see also Henkin, International Human Rights
and Rights in the United States, in I HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-26; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987).
19. For an argument that torture, genocide, slave trade and piracy constitute the universally
accepted "core norms" of international law, see Blum and Steinhardt, The Alien Tort Claims Act
after Filartiga v. Pefia Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L. J. 53, 87-97 (1981).
20. For arguments that contrary state practice does not abrogate from the status of prohibi-
tions against torture as a norm of customary international law, see 0. SCHACHTER, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 335-37; Sohn, The International Law of Human
Rights, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 347 (1981); Schechter, The Views of Chartists and Skeptics on
Human Rights, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 357 (1981).
21. This acceptance is in word though clearly not in deed. But many, notably the positivists,
argue that "law" denotes not just something that is followed but a principle accepted as a corner-
stone or key to a legal system. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Professor Falk
argues for an "even wider conception ... of the nature of law in world affairs" than that accepted
by the positivists. Falk sees "international law as embracing all normative phenomena that cre-
ate stable expectations in the life of international relations." R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 3 (1964).
22. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
23. Id. at 884.
24. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884, quoting DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
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lized in 28 U.S.C. § 1350, included prohibitions against torture was
therefore not only well-grounded in the declarations and legal codes of
nearly all nations, but also in the principles that the U.S. Government
had explicitly accepted as customary international law. Nevertheless,
the Filartiga decision was controversial because it marked a shift in
judicial thinking about the modern international law of human rights.
This controversy manifested itself in the second major case to address
these kinds of issues, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.25
B. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
Tel-Oren arose out of a suit filed by a group consisting of injured
victims and survivors of deceased victims of an armed attack on an
Israeli civilian bus. The defendants included the Libyan Arab Repub-
lic, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestine Information
Office, the National Association of Arab Americans, and the Palestine
Congress of North America. 26 The plaintiffs charged them with
torts27 committed in violation of international law.28  Plaintiffs
claimed jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C § 1331, which gives the dis-
trict courts jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Consti-
tution, laws or treaties of the United States," and 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
the Alien Tort Claims Act.
29
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' case both for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and as barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.3° On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, none of the three sitting judges could agree on a
rationale for affirming the dismissal of this case. Two opinions, those
of Judges Edwards and Bork, reflect in great detail on the propriety of
the Filartiga holding. Judge Edwards' detailed and lengthy opinion
supported the Filartiga decision, while Judge Bork's equally lengthy
attack on Filartiga's rationale strongly asserted that it violated the
constitutional separation of powers scheme.3 Much of this part of
Bork's opinion was joined by the third member of the Tel-Oren court,
Judge Robb. 32
RIGHTS FOR 1979, published by HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 96TH CONG. 2D SESS. I (Joint Comm. Print 1980).
25. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
26. Id. at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring).
27. Defendants also faced charges that included violations of treaties and the criminal laws of
the United States, as well as violations of the common law. Id.
28. Id. at 776.
29. Id. at 800 (Bork, J., concurring).
30. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F.Supp 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
31. Judge Robb in the third concurrence found the case nonjusticiable based on the political
question doctrine and stated that both Bork and Edwards failed "to reflect on the inherent inabil-
ity of federal courts to deal with cases such as this one." Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
32. See Tel-Oren, 771 F.2d at 823-27 (Robb, J., concurring).
[Vol. 10:886
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Edwards' opinion is significant because it developed several clear
and well-articulated defenses of the Filartiga decision 33. Notably, Ed-
wards' defense of Filartiga argued that its rationale was consistent
with current international law, with the statutory language of the
Alien Tort Claims Act, and with the constitutional separation of pow-
ers scheme. He contended that those who, like Judge Bork, inter-
preted 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as providing jurisdiction but no cause of
action, effectively nullified the statute, violating "a fundamental prin-
ciple of statutory construction that a statute should not be construed
so as to render any part of it 'inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.' -34
Judge Edwards, however, supported dismissal of the case on the
grounds that the defendants in Tel-Oren, unlike the defendant in Filar-
tiga, had not acted in an official capacity as agents of a state. He ar-
gued that the "law of nations does not impose the same responsibility
on non-state actors, such as the PLO, as it does on states and persons
acting under color of state law."' 35 In making this argument, Edwards
exhibited an unwillingness to construe section 1350 as a carte blanche
to prosecute all international evils. Instead, Edwards found limita-
tions placed on section 1350 in the same international legal principles
the Filartiga construction sought to enforce.
Bork's analysis represents an equally clear and well articulated at-
tack on Filartiga. Significantly, Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren focused on
the relevance of the separation of powers to claims arising under the
Alien Tort Claims Act. He contended that emerging norms of human
rights cannot be redressed through the Alien Tort Claims Act because
such adjudication violates the constitutional mandates of the separa-
tion of powers. 36 He further argued that the Alien Tort Claims Act
did not expressly grant a cause of action for torts committed in viola-
tion of international law, and that "separation of powers principles...
counsel courts, in a case like this, not to infer any cause of action not
expressly granted. ' 37 In response to Judge Edwards' explicit support
for Filartiga, Bork directly attacked Filartiga's construction and use of
33. Not all of these defenses, however, are relevant to this Note.
34. Id. at 778 (Edwards, J., concurring), quoting 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973).
35. Id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring).
36. Judge Edwards and others have attacked Bork's analysis in terms of its interpretation of
both international law and in its interpretation of the intent of the Alien Tort Claims Act. See Id.
at 780-798 (Edwards, J., concurring); see also Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human
Right Precepts In U.S. History and The Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 640-51 (1989).
37. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801. Bork opined that lacking a clear mandate of jurisdiction from
Congress, that plaintiffs would have to prove, in a section 1350 case, that international law or a
relevant treaty provided a cause of action. In this case he found no such cause of action. Id. at
812 (Bork, J., concurring). But see Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857 (1961); 726 F.2d at 786-788;
see also infra note 150.
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the Alien Tort Claims Act. 38
Bork used the act of state doctrine as support for his argument that
Filartiga violated the constitutional separation of powers scheme. He
argued that the doctrine was based "predominantly, if not exclusively,
on separation of powers concerns."' 39 He further maintained that ex-
tending the act of state doctrine to cases where adjudication "would
present problems of judicial competence and of judicial interference
with foreign relations" would bring it "closer, especially in its flexibil-
ity, to the political question doctrine."'40 Instead of attempting to
merge the doctrines and apply them to the Tel-Oren case, 4 1 however,
he relied on the separation of powers principles inherent in both of
those doctrines to reject the claims presented in Tel-Oren and the
"broad" reading given 28 U.S.C. § 1350 by Judge Edwards and the
Filartiga court.
42
Tel-Oren marked the first major judicial test of the validity of Fi-
lartiga's reasoning. The D.C. Circuit's wide divergence of opinion
highlighted not only the misconceptions surrounding Filartiga's ap-
proach to the Alien Tort Claims Act 43 but the importance of separa-
tion of powers concepts to the viability of that approach. In the wake
of Tel-Oren, a number of cases cited Filartiga.44 Few cases, however,
38. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 811-16 (Bork, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 804 (Bork, J., concurring).
40. Id.
41. Bork continued:
[w]hether the two doctrines should be merged and how, if merged, they would apply to the
allegations of appellants complaint are issues beyond the scope of our inquiry. Instead,
those doctrines are drawn upon for what they say about the separation of powers principles
that must inform a determination of the appropriateness of appellants' litigating their claims
in federal court.
Id.
42. See id. at 774-98 (Edwards, J., concurring).
43. See Paust, supra note 36, at 629-51.
44. Other cases that tangentially made reference to Filartiga's reasoning included Frolova v.
U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985), which held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
barred suit against the Soviet Union for mental anguish, physical distress and loss of consortium
caused by that nation's refusal to let a Russian husband emigrate to the United States to live with
his American-born wife. Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R. 623 F.Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985), held that the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act could not be read to extend immunity to a foreign sovereign's
clear violations of diplomatic immunity. This rationale was reversed in Amerada Hess v. Argen-
tine Republic, 109 S.Ct. 683 (1989), when the Supreme Court addressed its first section 1350
claim since Filartiga. In Amerada Hess, Liberian corporations brought an action under the Alien
Tort Claims Act claiming that the government of Argentina violated international law when it
destroyed an unarmed, non-belligerent oil tanker on the high seas during the 1982 Falklands/
Malvinas war. The plaintiffs argued that the Alien Tort Claims Act afforded them redress
against Argentina for an "unlawful taking of prize during wartime." Id. at 689. The Second
Circuit held for the plaintiffs, reasoning that Congress' failure to enact a pro tanto repealer of the
Alien Tort Claims Act at the time it enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act signaled an
intent not to eliminate " 'existing remedies in United States Courts for violations of international
law' by foreign states under the Alien Tort Statute." Id. at 687 (citing Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp, 830 F.2d 421, 431 (2d Cir. 1987)). The Supreme Court denied this
claim, stating that "Congress had violations of international law in mind when it enacted the
FSIA." Id. at 688. The Court argued Congress' failure to enact apro tanto repealer of the Alien
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have addressed the viability of an Alien Tort Claims Act suit against
an individual for torture committed in violation of the law of na-
tions.45 Of these cases, the most relevant was Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
in which the District Court for the Northern District of California
addressed facts similar to those addressed in Filartiga.
C. Forti v. Suarez-Mason
Forti constituted a strong endorsement of Filartiga's conclusions
with regard both to contemporary international law and the jurisdic-
tional reach of section 1350.46 The case arose when Argentine citizens
residing in the United States brought an action under section 1350 for
damages resulting inter alia, from torture, murder, disappearance
47
and prolonged arbitrary detention allegedly ordered by the defendant,
Carlos Guillermo Suarez-Mason. 48 Suarez-Mason was accused of or-
dering these actions in his role as a military commander during Argen-
tina's brutal "dirty war" against leftist subversion in the late 1970s.
49
The court upheld the cause of action in the strongest reaffirmation of
the Filartiga rationale to date.
The defendant urged the court to adopt interpretations of both sec-
tion 1350 and customary international law similar to those espoused
by Judge Bork in Tel-Oren. He argued that section 1350 is a purely
jurisdictional statute which required the plaintiffs to establish an in-
Tort Statute when it passed the FSIA may be explained at least in part by the lack of certainty as
to whether the Alien Tort Statute conferred jurisdiction in suits against foreign states." Id. at
689. In so doing the Court reversed the logic of Von Dardel, making it clear that a foreign state
could not be the target of a § 1350 action.
Amerada Hess thus brought into question the holding of another case that addressed the
justiciability of torture claims in U.S. Courts, Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-
1772-RMT (McX) slip op. (D. Cal., Sept. 28, 1984). Unlike Filartiga, which upheld a claim
under § 1350 for violation by an agent of a government, Siderman held a government (and one of
its provinces) responsible for the torture of one of its citizens. Principles expounded in Amerada
Hess, however, appear to bring Siderman's viability into question since Amerada Hess appears to
preclude torture claims against a sovereign (as opposed to claims against a government agent)
under § 1350.
45. A series of cases brought against former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos alleging
torture were dismissed on act of state grounds. See Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-0207 (D. Haw.
July 18, 1986); Sison v. Marcos, No. 86-0225 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986); Hilao v. Marcos (D.
Hawaii July 8, 1986); Ortigas v. Marcos, No. C 86-0975 SW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1987); Clemente
v. Marcos, No. C 86-1449 SW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1987). These cases are distinguishable from
Filartiga and Forti in that they present allegations against a former head of state as opposed to
allegations against an agent of state. For a strong argument refuting the act of state rationale as
grounds for dismissal of these cases see, Comment, ALIEN TOT CLAIMS ACT- Act of State
Doctrine - Act of State Doctrine Requires Dismissal of Human Rights Claims Brought against
Former Philippine President Residing in the United States, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 433 (1987).
46. 672 F.Supp. at 1539-43; 694 F.Supp. at 710-12.
47. Disappearance, or "causing the disappearance of individuals," referred to the allegations
that under Suarez-Mason's command people were ordered arrested and never heard from again.
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F.Supp. at 1538.
48. Id. at 1537-38.
49. Id.
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dependent, private right of action in international law. Suarez-Mason
further argued that the law of nations did not provide a cause of action
for the torts charged in the plaintiffs' complaint.50
The court rejected the defendant's contentions with a strong en-
dorsement of both Filartiga and Judge Edwards' concurrence in Tel-
Oren. It held that it was "persuaded ...that the interpretation of
Section 1350 adopted by the Second Circuit in Filartiga and largely
adopted by Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren is better reasoned and more
consistent with principles of international law" than the contrary
opinions adopted by Judges Bork and Robb in Tel-Oren.5 1 In addi-
tion, the court noted that "[tihere appears to be a growing consensus,
that Section 1350 provides a cause of action for certain 'international
common law torts.' "52 The court thus interpreted the Alien Tort
Claims Act as providing "not merely jurisdiction but a cause of action,
with the federal cause of action arising by recognition of certain 'inter-
national torts' through the vehicle of Section 1350." 53 Echoing the
Second Circuit's holding in Filartiga, the district court in Forti stated
that it had "no doubt that official torture constitutes a cognizable vio-
lation of the law of nations under Section 1350." 54 It further found
that prolonged arbitrary detention, summary execution 55 and causing
a person's disappearance 56 violated the law of nations.
III. THE ACT OF STATE AND POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINES
As evidenced by the above cases, questions about Filartiga have
not ended with inquiries into the status of torture under international
law. More vehemently contested 57 is the constitutionality of allowing
a federal court to adjudicate a matter, even if clearly in violation of
customary international law, that may implicate the U.S. foreign pol-
icy. 58 Unfortunately, in the past quarter of a century, beginning with
50. Id. at 1538.
51. Id. at 1539.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1540.
54. Id. at 1541.
55. Id. at 1541-42.
56. The court in the original case did not find disappearance to be a violation of the law of
nations, and dismissed this count with prejudice. Id. at 1542-43. On rehearing the court was
convinced that this too was now-an accepted international crime. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694
F.2d 707, 710-11 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
57. For further evidence that an action against an individual is acceptable under norms of
customary international law, see Paust's well documented rejection of Bork's claims regarding
the state of international law with respect to the status of the individual under international law.
Paust, supra note 36, at 647-50.
58. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 796-98 (Edwards, J., concurring),
801-05 (Bork, J., concurring), 825-26 (Robb, J., concurring); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770
F.2d 202, 208, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1481-
82 (9th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 10:886
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its holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,59 the Supreme
Court has sent rather confusing signals regarding the adjudicatory
limits of the federal courts in cases involving acts by officials of foreign
governments. As a result, lower courts have disagreed sharply on the
act of state doctrine's relevance to the Filartiga holding. 60 This section
looks at the of act of state and the political question doctrines6' and
focuses on their relationship to the constitutional doctrine of separa-
tion of powers as implicated by the Filartiga holding.
A. The Act of State Doctrine
Simply stated, the act of state doctrine is a judicially created doc-
trine which prohibits U.S. courts from determining the legality of cer-
tain acts attributable to and committed within the territory of a
foreign sovereign. Courts have further construed the doctrine as com-
manding that courts afford either affirmative relief or an affirmative
defense to effectuate these sovereign acts.62 It is widely accepted that
the act of state doctrine achieves this effect by modifying accepted
choice of law rules normally used in U.S. courts.63 In essence, the
doctrine requires U.S. courts to allow a foreign law64 to govern in cer-
tain instances, regardless of any choice of law principles that might
militate against applying that law. 65 In terms of Filartiga-style adjudi-
cation, the doctrine forces courts to face the question of whether the
alleged international crime was an "act of state" or merely an act of an
individual committed under the color of state authority.
59. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
60. Such differences can most clearly be recognized in the concurring opinions of Judges
Edwards and Bork in Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775-823. For a thorough discussion of the wide
divergence of opinion in the lower courts regarding the act of state doctrine, see Bazyler, Abolish-
ing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 344-65 (1986).
61. There has been some commentary to the effect that these doctrines have evolved into
essentially the same thing. See First National Citibank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,(hereinafter
Citibank) 406 U.S. 759, 777-788 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Bazyler, supra note 60,
at 341.
62. In other words, if a government acts lawfully within its borders, the act of state doctrine
mandates that courts uphold the nation's decree in any dispute that might arise within their
jurisdiction. Thus, for example, when Cuba expropriated goods from U.S. nationals within its
borders, the Court in Sabbatino was forced to uphold Cuba's right to the proceeds from a sale of
those goods that took place within the United States. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 400-12; see also
RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED), Tent. Draft
No. 6 § 469 (1985).
63. See Henkin, Act of State Today: Reflections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM J. TRANSNAT'L L.
175 (1967); Kirgis, Understanding the Act of State Doctrine's Effect, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 58
(1988).
64. For purposes of the doctrine almost any state action will be considered a foreign law,
thus the name "act of state" is attached to the doctrine.
65. See Henkin, supra note 63, at 178-82 (1967).
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1. History of the Act of State Doctrine
The roots of the act of state doctrine can be traced to seventeenth
century England, where the doctrine arose as a corollary to the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity.66 The United States Supreme Court first
recognized the act of state doctrine in the 1812 case, The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon67 but did not treat the doctrine as an in-
dependent source of immunity 68 until the 1897 case, Underhill v. Her-
nandez.69 There the court made the often quoted comment that "the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the gov-
ernment of another done within its own territory. ' 70 In the wake of
Underhill, however, the doctrine began to assume a broader, and more
vague, meaning in contrast to its original guarantee of personal immu-
nity to individuals acting on behalf of a government. 71 By the time the
Supreme Court attempted to modernize the doctrine in Sabbatino, it
had already begun to lose some of its clarity.
The modern act of state doctrine developed in the analyses of the
three Supreme Court cases that have addressed the issue in the past
quarter century, beginning with the 1964 holding in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino. Although eight justices joined the Sabbatino
holding72, neither of the succeeding cases, First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba73 and Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Re-
public of Cuba,74 produced majority opinions. Consequently, the doc-
trine as presently applied in lower federal courts is far from clear.
75
2. The Sabbatino, Citibank and Dunhill Holdings
A strong majority in Sabbatino agreed on a viable rationale under-
lying the act of state doctrine. They based this rationale on the consti-
tutional separation of powers scheme. Justice Harlan, who authored
the majority opinion, noted that "[t]he act of state doctrine does...
have 'constitutional' underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relation-
66. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416; Bazyler, supra note 60, at 330-31 (1986).
67. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
68. Bazyler, supra note 60, at 331.
69, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
70. Id. at 252.
71. Bazyler, supra note 60, at 332-33, notes that the doctrine "was soon used in connection
with the territorial principle of choice of law, which in the past accorded final authority to sover-
eigns over disputes occurring within their domains .... " He further points out that this was the
rationale for the next three significant cases decided on act of state doctrine principles: American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297 (1918); and Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
72. The only justice who dissented in Sabbatino was Justice White. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
439 (White, J., dissenting).
73. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
74. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
75. See Bazyler, supra note 60, at 344-61 (1986).
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ships between branches of government in a system of separation of
powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make
and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of interna-
tional relations."' 76 Justice Harlan emphasized, however, that the act
of state doctrine was "compelled by neither international law nor the
Constitution."' 77 According to Justice Harlan, the act of state doctrine
was a judicially created doctrine that "reflect[ed] the proper distribu-
tion of functions between the judicial and political branches of the
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs."' 78 In justifying
the Court's reaffirmation of this judicially created doctrine, he ex-
pressed concern that the judicial branch might infringe upon the for-
eign policy functions of the executive and legislative branches. 79 The
Court's concern in this situation reflected its desire not to allow judi-
cial review of issues entrusted to the "political" branches of
government.
Sabbatino, however, stressed that its reiteration of the act of state
doctrine did not represent judicial abandonment of issues involving
foreign affairs. While deferring to the political branches in the case
before it, the Sabbatino opinion nevertheless made clear that some is-
sues involving foreign affairs "touch more sharply on national nerves
than do others .... "80 Thus, where widespread acceptance of a norm
of international law mandated a principled adjudication, or where the
United States had no overarching "political interest" in the outcome
of a case, the Court determined that the act of state doctrine should
not apply.
81
Though the Sabbatino analysis seemed fairly clear, subsequent at-
tempts to expand upon it in Citibank and Dunhill confused the precise
contours of the act of state doctrine. The authors of each opinion
strenuously disagreed as to how separation of powers concerns should
affect its application. This disagreement was due, in part, to conflict-
ing notions about the executive's proper role in its invocation. 82 De-
spite these conflicting viewpoints, however, the authors of the various
opinions in these two cases emphasized the centrality of separation of
powers principles to the doctrine.
The justices had great difficulty delineating the actual effects of
separation of powers considerations in the application of the doctrine.
The opinions in Citibank illustrated this problem. Justice Rehnquist's
plurality opinion in that case adopted the so-called "Bernstein" excep-
76. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
77. Id. at 427.
78. Id. at 427-28.
79. Id. at 427-33.
80. Id. at 428.
81. Id.
82. See infra, notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
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tion,8 3 which would exempt a case from the act of state doctrine if the
executive indicated to the courts that adjudication of the issue at hand
would not be inimical to the executive's handling of foreign affairs.
8 4
A majority of the Court, however, in concurring opinions by Justices
Douglas8 5 and Powell,8 6 and in a dissent written by Justice Brennan
joined by three other justices, explicitly rejected this exception.8 7 The
justices, unanimously agreed that the act of state doctrine remained a
viable and important tool in maintaining the constitutional separation
of powers scheme.
88
The Supreme Court's next examination of the act of state doctrine
in Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba addressed a situation
where the petitioners were Cuban "interventors" named by the Cuban
Government to "possess and occupy" expropriated businesses in
Cuba. The Dunhill plurality, per Justice White, found that the in-
terventors' actions did not arise from "a foreign state's public or gov-
ernmental actions,"89 but rather from a state's behavior as an
83. This exemption originally arose in the case of Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Ameri-
kaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), where the Second Circuit allowed a cause of action by a
victim of Nazi expropriations as the result of a letter from the Acting Legal Adviser of the
Department of State, which stated that the executive had adopted a "policy" to "relieve Ameri-
can courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of
the acts of Nazi officials." Id. at 376. The only successful application of this doctrine up until
this time had been in the Bernstein case.
84. Citibank, 406 U.S. at 764-70.
85. Id. at 770-73 (Douglas, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 773-76 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 776-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. The plurality per Rehnquist made clear its belief that separation of powers was served
best by allowing the Executive Branch, "charged as it is with primary responsibility for the
conduct of foreign affairs," to determine whether a case already within the adjudicatory powers
of the court should be exempt by the act of state doctrine from a decision on the merits. Rehn-
quist was obviously concerned with the attack made upon his holding in Brennan's dissent that
accused the Court of abdicating its powers to define jurisdiction to another branch of government
and concluded that:
Our holding confines the courts to adjudication of the case before them, and leaves to the
Executive Branch the conduct of foreign relations. In so doing, it is both faithful to the
principle of separation of powers and consistent with earlier cases applying the act of state
doctrine where we lacked the sort of representation from the Executive Branch that we have
in this case.
Citibank, 406 U.S. at 772. Both concurrences explicitly rejected the plurality's holding that the
executive could determine the jurisdiction of the courts in these cases. Justice Powell most
clearly grounded his rejection of the "Bernstein exemption" in separation of powers, stating that
he "would be uncomfortable with a doctrine which would require the judiciary to receive the
Executive's permission before invoking its jurisdiction." According to Powell, "[s]uch a notion,
in the name of separation of powers, seems to ... conflict with that very doctrine." Id. at 773
(Powell, J., concurring).
Brennan's dissent equated the act of state doctrine with the political question doctrine, dis-
cussed infra. It held that the plurality's analysis, by allowing executive determination of the
contours of a political question "countenances an exchange of roles between the judiciary and the
Executive, contrary to the firm insistence in Sabbatino on the separation of powers." Id. at 791-
92 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698.
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international commercial entity.90 According to Justice White "[n]o
statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cuban Government itself
was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had repudiated its obliga-
tions in general or any class thereof or that it had as a sovereign matter
determined to confiscate the amounts due the foreign importers." 9'
The plurality concluded that these actions did not constitute an act of
state and were therefore not entitled to deference under the act of state
doctrine.
92
Three members of the Dunhill plurality accepted the Bernstein ex-
emption, 93 justifying it with the paradigmatic separation of powers ar-
gument that it prevents "embarrassment" to the executive. 94 The
range of dissenting views among the members of the Dunhill Court,
however, once again indicated that a large degree of uncertainty had
crept into application of the act of state doctrine in the decade follow-
ing Sabbatino. Dunhill made clear that the Court was unable to fash-
ion a coherent approach to the modern act of state doctrine.
Even while application of the act of state doctrine lost its coher-
ence, however, a majority of justices in both Citibank and Dunhill con-
tinued to proclaim that their approaches were faithful to the strictures
of Sabbatino.95 Though the opinions in Citibank and Dunhill dis-
agreed sharply on the contours of the doctrine, each continued to
stress the the "consitutional underpinnings" of comity between the
political and judicial branches of government in the handling of for-
eign affairs.96 Adjudication of a human rights claim in a U.S. federal
court must therefore incorporate this thematic base, which remains
one of the few common grounds upon which the Court continues to
base the act of state doctrine.
B. The Political Question Doctrine
The relationship between the political and judicial branches of gov-
90. Id. at 698-99. Quoting the 1934 case of Ohio v. Helvering, the plurality stated "[i]f a state
chooses to go into the business of buying and selling commodities, its right to do so may be
conceded so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned; but the exercise of the right is not the
performance of a governmental function .... Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369, quoted in
Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 696.
91. Id. at 695.
92. Id. at 694-95.
93. Justice Stevens did not join this part of the opinion. Thus, Justices White and Rehnquist
and Chief Justice Burger, the three justices who recognized the Bernstein exemption in Citibank,
were the only three who recognized it in Dunhill.
94. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 697-98.
95. Justice White, who dissented in Sabbatino, and former Justice Powell were notable excep-
tions to this trend. Powell even claimed in Citibank that if he had been a member of the Sabba-
tino Court he would have probably dissented. Citibank, 406 U.S. at 774 (Powell, J., concurring).
96. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 697-98, (opinion of White., J.), 715 (Powell, J., concurring), 724-25
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Citibank, 406 U.S. at 765-70 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.), 772 (Douglas,
J., concurring), 774-76 (Powell, J., concurring), 785-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Sabbatino, 376
U.S. at 423 (opinion of Harlan, J.), 461-67 (White, J., dissenting).
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ernment also lies at the heart of the political question doctrine, a doc-
trine with a long, and some might say infamous, history in U.S.
jurisprudence. The doctrine's basic tenet holds that there are certain
constitutional issues best left to the "political" branches of govern-
ment and thus inappropriate for judicial resolution. 97 It has been es-
pecially prominent in cases concerning U.S. foreign relations, since
"many such questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the
Government's views."
98
The political question doctrine can be traced as far back as the
1849 case of Luther v. Borden,99 where the Supreme Court refused to
inquire into a congressional judgment as to the lawful government of
Rhode Island. 100 Despite its long history, its underlying rationale con-
tinues to be a major source of debate. Recent discussion of this ration-
ale tends to begin with two divergent strains of thought: the
"classical" theory associated with Professor Wechsler, t0' and the
"prudential" theory associated with Professor Bickel. 10 2 According to
the so called "classical" theory, the political question doctrine requires
the judiciary to determine "whether the Constitution has committed
to another agency of government the autonomous determination of the
issue raised."'' 0 3 The "prudential" theory, on the other hand, looks
not only to whether the Constitution has committed resolution of a
particular issue to the judiciary, but also to the political desirability of
judicial resolution of that issue as well. 104 According to this "pruden-
tial" doctrine, "political" necessity might require the Court to abstain
from pronouncing its "ultimate Constitutional judgment,"' 0 5 even
97. See Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question ", 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1031 (1985).
98. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1961).
99. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
100. Luther v. Borden arose out of the Dorr Rebellion, an 1842 rebellion that pitted support-
ers of a new state constitution against supporters of the charter government who accepted neither
the new constitution nor the leadership of Dorr, the governor elected under its authority. Dorr
made an abortive attempt to take power by force and, during this time, officers of the charter
government broke into Luther's house. Luther sued for trespass, claiming that the charter gov-
ernment had been displaced in 1842 and therefore the defendant's entry was unauthorized and
unlawful. In essence, he sought to litigate the existence and authority of the government during
this upheaval. Both the lower court and the Supreme Court refused to second-guess the congres-
sional determination as to the lawfulness of the charter government of Rhode Island at this time.
101. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
102. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
103. Wechsler, supra note 101, at 1-6.
104. According to Professor Bickel, under this prudential doctrine:
[T]he role of the Court and its raison d'etre are to evolve 'to preserve, protect and defend'
principle. If the political institutions at last insist upon a course of action that cannot be
accommodated to principle, it is no part of the function of the court to bless it, however
double-negatively.
A. BICKEL, supra note 102, at 188; see also Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 40, 47-51 (1961); see also L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
105. A. Bickel, supra note 102, at 183.
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in situations where such a judgment would not violate the
Constitution. 106
These theories, however, no longer stand alone in the modern aca-
demic discussion of the political question doctrine. Recently, com-
mentators have limited or questioned the need for the doctrine
altogether. 107 This discussion has even included the suggestion that
the "so called" political question doctrine does not exist, and that
traditional political question abstention represents no more than "the
ordinary respect by courts for the political domain."
10 8
Despite this rather uncertain philosophical footing, the political
question doctrine is an ever-present factor in the analysis of federal
cases affecting international relations. Like the act of state doctrine,
its influence in this area is often justified by the desire that there be "a
single voiced statement of the Government's views"' 0 9 in foreign af-
fairs and for preventing "embarrassment" to the political departments
of the U.S. Government in their international dealings. 110 As a result,
analysis of Filartiga's validity must incorporate issues raised by the
political question doctrine.
In cases involving foreign relations, courts have employed the
political question doctrine to justify a number of instances of judicial
deference to executive decisions. Classic examples of areas in which
the judiciary normally defers to executive judgment include: recogni-
tion of foreign governments,III recognition of sovereignty over territo-
ries, interpretation of treaties, determination of a person's status as a
representative of a foreign government, and dates and duration of hos-
tilities. 1 2 The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the contention
that "all questions touching foreign relations are political ques-
tions." " 3  In Baker v. Carrt1 4, the Court's most explicit modern de-
lineation of the doctrine, the court stated that:
106. See Redish, supra note 97, at 1032; see also Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 520-23 (1966), discussing Professor Bickel's
"prudential estimate of the desirability of deciding a given issue under particular circumstances."
107. See Scharpf, supra note 106; Redish, supra note 97.
108. Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600-01 (1976); see also
Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political Question Doctrine, "and Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1135, 1166-67 (1970).
109. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
110. Justice White aptly characterized this prevailing philosophy in his Sabbatino dissent
when he stated that "political matters in the realm of foreign affairs are within the exclusive
domain of the executive branch as, for example, issues for which there are no available standards
or which are textually committed by the Consitiution to the executive." Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
461 (White, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. 144, 149 (1820); see also United States v.
Palmer, 16 U.S. 610, 634-635 (1818).
112. Baker, 369 U.S. at 212-13.
113. Id. at 211.
114. 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
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It is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches for-
eign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field
seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the particular ques-
tion posed, in terms of the history of its management by the political
branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature
and posture in the specific case, and of the possible consequences ofjudi-
cial action.1 15
Thus, while the political question doctrine may stand as a hurdle to
adjudication of issues "touching on" foreign policy, it clearly does not
represent an absolute bar to their judicial resolution.
It is also possible to credit Baker v. Carr with setting forth a set of
specific criteria representing a clear delineation of the standards by
which to discern the types of issues that may be consigned to "polit-
ical" branches of government. In Baker, the Supreme Court rejected a
lower court ruling that the political question doctrine barred an equal
protection challenge to a state's voting apportionment scheme. In de-
fining the circumstances that present "political questions" the Court
found that:
[P]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political ques-
tion is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking in-
dependent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
ence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embar-
rassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
the question. 116
These standards have come to represent the modern criteria by which
federal courts abstain from judging the merits of a case on the ground
that it presents a political question." 17 Any judicial action that might
impinge on the ability of the executive to conduct foreign affairs will
be judged against these considerations. Like the act of state doctrine,
the political question doctrine thus seems to be a result of the judici-
ary's concern that it not tread into areas, whether as the result of Con-
stitutional commands or prudential concerns, properly the domain of
the "political" branches of government.
115. Id. at 211-12.
116. Id. at 217.
117. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1
(1973); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770
F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS PRINCIPLES IN FILARTIGA'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE ALIEN TORTS
CLAIMS ACT
The similarity of the language used to justify both the act of state
and political question doctrines highlights their common philosophical
underpinnings. In Sabbatino, the Court stated that the act of state
doctrine "arises out of the basic relationship between branches of gov-
ernment in a system of separation of powers;" '"18 in Baker the Court
stated that the political question doctrine arises out of "the relation-
ship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government . . .[and was] primarily a function of the separation of
powers."" t9 In its use of this nearly identical language, the Court has
indicated that both the political question and act of state doctrines
serve separation of powers concerns by enforcing the constitutional
delineation of authority among the branches of government. This lan-
guage makes clear that cases like Filartiga, that might "touch" on for-
eign affairs, must not impinge on the executive's constitutional
mandate to carry out the foreign relations of the United States.' 2
0
This similarity between the act of state doctrine's "constitutional
underpinnings," and the political question doctrine's contention that a
matter may be "committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government,"' 2' has created a large arsenal of conceptual weapons
with which to frame a separation of powers attack on Filartiga.122
Separation of powers concerns have correspondingly been at the fore-
front of criticisms of that decision. Not surprisingly, it has been ar-
gued that the issues implicated by actions brought under the Alien
Tort Claims Act for torture inherently impinge on the executive's abil-
ity to conduct foreign affairs. It has also been argued that, because
there is no record of the legislative intent behind section 1350,123 Filar-
tiga's modern reinterpretation of its language amounts to extreme, and
even improper, judicial activism.
124
This section examines these separation of powers attacks on Filar-
118. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
119. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210.
120. See Scharpf, supra note 106, at 538 (1966); see also Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren,
756 F.2d at 801-802, where he stated:
The crucial element of the doctrine of separation of powers in this case is the principle that
"the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to
the Executive and Legislative - 'the political' - Departments." Oetjen v. Central Leather
Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). That principle has been translated into a limitation on judi-
cial power in the international law area principally through the act of state and political
question doctrines. Whether or not this case falls within one of these categories, the con-
cerns that underlie them are present and demand recognition here.
121. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
122. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798-827 (opinions of Bork and Robb, JJ., concurring).
123. Id. at 816.
124. Id. at 815 (Bork, J., concurring).
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tiga. It assumes, for the sake of argument, that these attacks are via-
ble, but nevertheless argues that use of the Alien Tort Claims Act to
adjudicate claims alleging torture committed in violation of interna-
tional law does not violate the Constitutional separation of powers
mandate. This section further attempts to show that the Filartiga de-
cision is more compatible with the separation of powers scheme than
the position advocated by its critics. Most notably, it contends that
Filartiga's critics overestimate the political "embarrassment" to the
executive that might result from allowing legal redress against an ex-
government official residing in this country.
A. The Alien Tort Claims Act and U.S. Foreign Policy
Even as it reaffirmed the existence of the political question doctrine
in Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court warned that "it is error to sup-
pose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance."'' 25 The court noted that judicial disposi-
tion of an issue relies on "a discriminating analysis of the particular
question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the polit-
ical branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in light of its
nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible conse-
quences of judicial action."' 26 Without such "discriminating analy-
sis," the political question doctrine will not defeat a human rights
claim on the mere possibility that it might "touch" foreign affairs.' 2
7
In applying the act of state docrine in Sabbatino, the Supreme
Court employed a type of analysis that might be required in political
question cases. The Sabbatino Court noted that both the degree of
codification in international law and the importance of an issue's im-
plications on U.S. foreign affairs were relevant factors in determining
whether the act of state doctrine applies in a given situation. 28 Ac-
cording to Sabbatino, "the less important the implications of an issue
to U.S. foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in
the political branches."' 29 Notably, both cases expressed concern that
adjudication of such issues might hinder the executive's ability to man-
age U.S. foreign affairs, a concern that emphasizes the centrality of
separation of powers concerns to both doctrines.
The concern for the executive's ability to manage foreign affairs
has often been expressed as concern that judicial resolution of an issue
125. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
126. Id. at 211-12.
127. See Tigar, supra note 108, at 1169-70, discussing two cases where the Court actually
decided cases intimately involving foreign affairs: Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944), and Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In their disposition
of war powers claims, these cases were clearly more compelling than a case against an ex-govern-
ment official for torture.
128. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
129. Id.
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might "embarrass" the executive in the handling of U.S. foreign rela-
tions. Judge Robb made a clear, if somewhat hysterical, statement of
this position in his Tel-Oren concurrence. According to Robb, "[t]he
certain results of judicial recognition of jurisdiction over cases such as
this one are embarassment to the nation, the transformation of trials
into forums for the exposition of political propaganda, and debase-
ment of commonly accepted notions of civilized conduct."' 30 In light
of the present international realities, however, this concern appears
misplaced. It can be argued peruasively that the executive's "embar-
rassment" would actually increase if it were forced to take affirmative
action every time a universally accepted norm of customary interna-
tional law was presented to a federal court.' 3 ' Indeed, the state de-
partment may be much more embarrassed by the need to take a
political stand on questions of this nature than by the need to explain
neutral and principled judicial decisions to foreign governments.
t32
130. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 826 (Robb, J., concurring).
131. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) was meant to achieve the same kind of
result. Under the FSIA, courts, rather than the State Department, determine questions of sover-
eign immunity. A Congressional report explaining the FSIA stated that: :
A principle purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from
the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications
of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions are
made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process. The Depart-
ment of State would be freed from pressures from foreign governments to recognize their
immunity from suit and from any adverse consequences resulting from an unwillingness of
the Department to support that immunity.
Note, Separation of Powers and Adjudication of Human Rights Claims Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act - Hanoch Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert
denied, 105 SCt. 1354 (1985), quoting H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), 60
WASH. L. REV. 697, 711 n.106 (1985), For a good discussion of the parallels between the FSIA
and the Alien Tort Claims Act see id. at 710-11.
Falk argues for similar deference in all matters in which international law allows for princi-
pled adjudication. According to Falk, "whether the United States is hostile or friendly to the
state involved in the litigation should not be allowed to influence the judicial outcome. Internal
deference should be based on functional principles of allocation and not upon ad hoc subordina-
tions to executive policy." R. FALK, supra note 21, at 10-11.
132. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 436, where in discussing its non-
acceptance of the Bernstein principle the Court noted that forcing the executive branch to take
an official position might embarrass the executive more than allowing it to stay out of the pro-
cess. The Court noted that:
[O]ften the State Department will wish to refrain from taking an official position, particu-
larly at a moment that would be dictated by the development of private litigation but might
be inopportune diplomatically ... It is highly questionable whether the examination of
validity by the judiciary should depend on an educated guess by the Executive as to probable
result and, at any rate, should a prediction be wrong, the Executive might be embarrassed in
its dealings with other countries.
See also Scharpf, supra note 106, at 582 (1966), discussing Justice Harlan's suggestion in Sabba-
tino "that the State Department may be much more embarrassed by the necessity to take a stand
on questions of this nature than by the need to explain decisions of American courts to a foreign
government." Id.; see also Note, Judicial Deference to the State Department on International
Legal Issues, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 91 (1948).
The attempt by former President Carter to formulate a coherent human rights policy also
supports this argument. Despite its best intentions, his human rights policy was plagued with
recrimination and accusation of hypocrisy, since the political reality of the time mandated that
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This is especially true in cases like Filartiga and Forti where the
issues implicate universally accepted international legal principles, and
greater "embarrassment" to the United States would likely come from
a "political" rather than a principled decision. The situations
presented in Filartiga and, more recently, in Forti show that while
there might be some effect on U.S. foreign relations from such adjudi-
cation, the implications arising from these cases are minimal. 133 The
defendants in either case were neither current government officials,
nor did they claim any sort of diplomatic immunity. 134 Pefia, for ex-
ample, had entered the United States on a visitor's visa and had stayed
illegally with his girlfriend long after that visa had run out. 135
As noted by the State Department 136 and international scholars, 137
no nation is likely to admit that torture is an officially sanctioned act
of state, even if the alleged torturer committed his crimes in his capac-
ity as an agent of that state. Adjudication of an action in tort for
torture thus does not constitute an explicit condemnation of an official
government policy, since the alleged torturer's individual actions, as
opposed to his government's policies, are at issue in the adjudication.
This further lessens the chance of executive "embarrassment" result-
ing from a section 1350 action for torture. 138
Insult to a country's judicial system is also a possible result of re-
dressing claims under section 1350.139 Under the doctrine of forum
nations with less importance to U.S. geopolitical interests, like Argentina and Chile, received its
full censure, while important allies, like South Korea and Iran, received only minimal censure.
133. The minimal implications for the executive are illustrated most clearly by the actions
taken by the executive in these cases. Instructive in these situations is the fact that the U.S.
government in Forti did not intervene in the case and in Filartiga intervened in behalf of the
plaintiffs. See United States. Memorandum for the United States Submitted to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Petia-Irala, 19 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 585 (1980). To his
credit, Judge Bork recognized that Filartiga presented a fact situation where "the challenged
actions were not attributed to a participant in American foreign relations, and the relevant inter-
national law principle was one whose definition was neither disputed nor politically sensitive."
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 820 (Bork, J., concurring).
134. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878; Forti, 694 F.Supp. at 708.
135. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d, at 878-79.
136. See Memorandum For the United States Submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit in Filartiga v. Petia-Irala, supra note 132, at 598 n.34 noting that:
[I]t has been the Department of State's general experience that no government has asserted a
right to torture its own nationals. Where reports of such torture elicit some credence, a state
usually responds by denial or, less frequently, by asserting that the conduct was unauthor-
ized or constituted rough treatment short of torture.
137. For a good discussion of the evolution of the international law of human rights to its
present state see Blum and Steinhardt, The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala,
22 HARV. J. INT'L L. 53, 64-87 (1981).
138. The State Department's support for the Filartigas' action in this case and its continued
pressure on the Paraguayan Government to improve its human rights record, attests to the fact
that the Executive's handling of these relations was not impeded, and might have actually been
strengthened by judicial action in this matter. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
139. Judge Bork was quick to point this out in his Tel-Oren concurrence, stating that "[tihe
United States would be perceived, and justly so, not as a nation magnanimously refereeing inter-
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non conveniens the plaintiff has a choice of forum, but the court may
choose not to exercise jurisdiction if it decides that the case may pro-
ceed justly and more conveniently in another court. If there are
doubts about whether a case can be tried justly in the other forum, the
proper procedure is for the court to take the case. 140 Thus, the adjudi-
cation of a torture claim may implicitly indicate a lack of faith in the
judicial system of another nation. Insult is, however, by no means
inevitable in such actions. First, convenience of the parties may indi-
cate that the U.S. forum would be the most suitable. Secondly, adjudi-
cation in a U.S. forum does not preclude, and may actually
complement, the judicial process in the defendant's state. The Forti
case is illustrative.
In Forti, the defendant, Suarez-Mason, simultaneously faced crimi-
nal indictment in Argentina for many of the same actions being liti-
gated in the U.S. civil action. While the Xrgentine government argued
before the district court that Suarez-Mason should be extradited to
Argentina to face the criminal charges pending against him, it never
challenged the section 1350 action pending against him in that same
district court.141 It may be argued that rather than complicating U.S.-
Argentine relations, the adjudication actually strengthened them since
the Forti outcome complemented rather than hindered the Argentine
justice system. 142
Although the above argument may be seen as conjectural, it never-
theless underscores the conjectural nature of arguments that "certain"
embarrassment will befall the executive branch when the judiciary de-
cides these issues. The inevitability that such adjudication will do
harm to our foreign relations, or cause "embarrassment" to the execu-
tive is largely illusory. The Supreme Court stressed in Baker v. Carr
that it will abstain from deciding a case on its merits only after apply-
ing a three step "discriminating analysis." This analysis considers a
national disputes but as an officious interloper and an international busybody." Tel-Oren, 726
F.2d at 821 (Bork, J., concurring).
140. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER AND E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3828, 33 n.13 (Supp 1980); see also SOHN AND BURGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PRO-
TECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 103 (1973).
141. In re Requested Extradition of Carlos Guillermo Suarez-Mason, 694 F.Supp. 676 (N.D.
Cal. 1988).
142. A further benefit of this trial is that it may have served to decrease the inevitable suspi-
cion that the U.S. actually supported the anti-communist terror committed by the military re-
gimes. The United States is especially susceptible to this suspicion since it has developed a
reputation (whether deserved or not) as a supporter of any anti-communist movement in Latin
America. In its "dirty war" the Argentine military continuously justified these atrocities under
the guise that they constituted a war on communist subversion. In the words of the Army repre-
sentative, and President of the first junta, Jorge Rafael Videla (now serving a life sentence in
Argentina for his part in these human rights abuses), the objective of this "dirty war" was to put
an end to "subversive thought." 694 F. Supp. at 680, quoting NUNCA MAS: THE REPORT OF THE
ARGENTINE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED. Thus, there exists a degree of
popular suspicion of the United States' complicity in these crimes. (The author also bases the
statements in this footnote on his personal experiences living in post-junta Argentina).
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case's importance in terms of its consequences to U.S. foreign rela-
tions, its susceptibility to judicial handling, and the history of its man-
agement by a particular branch. 143 Filartiga and Forti demonstrate
that adjudication of universally recognized crimes under international
law can be both judicially manageable and not detrimental to the over-
all diplomatic posture of the United States.
Although human rights issues are relatively new to the law, it has
been nearly a century since the Supreme Court's Paquette Habana
stressed that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate juris-
diction as long as questions of depending on it are duly presented for
determination."' 144 Total judicial abdication of human rights issues to
the "political branches" of government on the mere conjectural possi-
bility of "embarrassment" would thus constitute an extraordinary
step. 145 This step would place the executive in the uncomfortable posi-
tion of making a political decision every time a suspected torturer
came before U.S. courts. It would also send a signal to many of those
very torturers that the United States represents safe haven if they
should ever need a new home. Finally, it would also hinder the strong
U.S. interest in strengthening international law 146 and protecting
human rights globally.
B. Who are the Judicial Activists?
The debate over the propriety of judicial abdication (or resolution)
of these issues has implicated another dimension of the separation of
powers question. No discussion of Filartiga is complete without an
attack or defense of the propriety of Filartiga's reinterpretation of the
Alien Tort Claims Act. Those who have reviewed Alien Tort Claims
cases have had some difficulty understanding the context in which it
was drafted.' 47 Despite this fact, the law stands on the books with
both language148 and history 49 that do not preclude coherent
143. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
144. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
145. See Justice Powell's concurrence in Citibank in which Powell argued that allowing the
executive to make a justiciability determination "in the name of the separation of powers seems
to ... conflict with that very doctrine." Citibank, 406 U.S. at 773. See also supra note 88.
Judicial abdication of such issues would not even seem consistent with the history of human
rights in U.S. law. See Paust, supra note 36, at 543-629.
146. See R. FALK, supra note 21, at 12-13, where he states:
The United States is the dominant law-oriented state. As a result, it possesses a special
responsibility that can only be discharged by a self-conscious realization of its long-term
interests in the development of a more stable world order. The use of domestic courts pro-
vides a symbolic means for the promotion of these interests.
147. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 886; Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775, 811-16 (Bork, J., concurring);
see also ITT v. Vencap, LTD, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), where Judge Friendly referred
to the Alien Tort Claims Act as "a kind of legal Lohengrin ... no one seems to know whence it
came."
148. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779 (opinion of Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards
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application. ' 50
This was pointed out by Judge Edwards in his concurrence in Tel-
Oren where he suggested that separation of powers concerns are better
served by allowing suits such as Filartiga.'5t In an attack on Judge
Bork's construction of the statute, Judge Edwards argued that by con-
structing section 1350 as granting no independent cause of action,
Bork essentially regarded it as a statute "that had no meaning when
passed by Congress and none today."'' 52 Judge Edwards noted that
"to enforce a construction that yields that result is not only to insult
Congress, but inappropriately to place judicial power substantially
above that of the legislature."'' 5 3 Essentially, Judge Edwards argued
that Judge Bork engaged in the same sort of judicial activism of which
Judge Bork accused both the Second Circuit and Judge Edwards him-
self. 54 While Bork spoke of separation of powers principles, he pur-
found that "[tihe language of the statute is explicit on the issue: by its express terms, nothing
more than a violation of the law of nations is required to invoke section 1350."
149. For an extremely thorough discussion of the long history of human right precepts in
U.S. jurisprudence, see Paust, supra note 36, at 543-629.
150. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887-88, where the Second Circuit stated that:
Although the Alien Tort Statute has rarely been the basis for jurisdiction during its long
history, in light of the foregoing discussion, there can be little doubt that this action is
properly brought in federal court... the narrowing construction that the Alien Tort Statute
has previously received reflects the fact that earlier cases did not involve such well-estab-
lished, universally recognized norms of international law that are here at issue.
It is also worth noting that the Alien Tort Claims Act has been construed at least once in modern
times as providing jurisdiction over an international tort of less severe gravity and international
condemnation. Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857 (D.Md. 1961), found jurisdiction under section
1350 for the international tort of fraudulent use of a passport.
Adra involved suit between a divorced couple (both aliens) over custody of their only child.
After the divorce, a Lebanese court granted the father custody over the child, but the mother
refused to relinquish custody and eventually moved to the United States. It was alleged that the
defendant had falsified her passport in order to bring her daughter into the United States. Adra
first found jurisdiction over the defendant in municipal law, since "the unlawful taking or
witholding of a minor child from the custody of the parent or parents entitled to such custody is
a tort." Id. at 862. Second, Adra found that the falsification of a passport (in order to spirit a
child to the United states in order to violate the custody order) constituted a violation of interna-
tional law. Though Adra can be distinguished from Filartiga in that it found jurisdication in both
municipal and international law, it sigiiificantly did not require plaintiffs to plead a specific right
to sue granted by the law of nations. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Further, the
court never broached the question of the separation of powers implications of a suit under section
1350. According to the Adra opinion "[t]he wrongful acts were ... committed in violation of the
law of nations. And since they caused direct and special injury to the plaintiff, he may bring an
action in tort therefore." Id. at 865; see also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 786-788 (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
151. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 778 (Edwards, J., concurring), stating that "[tihere is a funda-
mental principle of statutory construction that a statute should not be construed so as to render
any part of it 'inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant' ", quoting, C. SANDS, 2A STAT-
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Judge Edwards eloquently described Judge Bork's position this way: "Vigorously wav-
ing in one hand a separation of powers banner, ironically, with the other he rewrites Congress'
words and renounces the task that Congress has placed before him." Id. at 790.
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posely ignored the statute's plain language that gave district courts
jurisdiction over civil suits "by an alien for tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.'
55
It can be forcefully argued that Judge Bork thus shirked his consti-
tutional duty to "say what the law is." In waiting for further congres-
sional direction, Bork relied on an incomplete history at the expense of
following language that is facially possible to construe. Further, the
history of this statute does not appear to be as incomplete as Bork
contended. Human rights precepts certainly existed at the time of the
First Judiciary Act. 156 His analysis appears to be based more on his
own views of a proper judicial role in such disputes than on the lan-
guage of the statute, its history, or canons of statutory construction. If
we follow the dictates of language, history, and construction it would
appear that the separation of powers argument is better served by Fi-
lartiga's affirmative construction of section 1350, than by one which,
as Judge Bork put it, "await[s] clarification elsewhere."1
57
CONCLUSION
In many respects the Filartiga decision exposed U.S. courts to a
new reality in the international sphere. The rights of man, headily
affirmed in the aftermath of Nazi brutality, no longer stand as mere
pious proclamations; they have become international norms of behav-
ior. United States law will not fully accept that new reality, however,
until the torturer is viewed in our courts "like the pirate and the slave
trader before him ... an enemy of all mankind." 15 8
The Alien Tort Claims Act appears to be a vehicle by which the
First U.S. Congress allowed international law into our courts. Now in
a new and very different era, these words, like so many others in the
U.S. Constitution and laws, have taken on new meaning, raising famil-
iar arguments about judicial usurpation of power. In a sense these
arguments illustrate a much broader argument over the proper role for
the courts in the U.S. separation of powers scheme. But in the contin-
uing debate over the Filartiga rationale, those most loudly decrying
judicial activism seem to be most active in ignoring the statute's lan-
guage and history, as well as the world in which it operates.
In numerous decisions the Supreme Court has emphatically
stressed that separation of powers concerns do not exclude the judici-
ary from matters touching upon the foreign relations of the United
States. As this Note has shown, issues implicated in Filartiga and sim-
ilar cases are not those which the Court has found consigned solely to
155. 28 U.S.C § 1350.
156. See Paust, supra note 36, at 650-51.
157. Tel-Oren, 727 F.2d at 823.
158. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
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the political branches of government by the separation of powers doc-
trine. A reversal of Filartiga's rationale by the Supreme Court would
thus not only seriously retard the development of the international law
of human rights, but also signal a fundamental change in the current
separation of powers scheme.
